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ln the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
E. L. GEAR and FERN BATE GEAR,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

CASE
NO. 10895

ROBERT H. DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

Plaintiffs filed an action upon the theory of tort, obtaining money by fraudulent representation. Defendant
answered that on the 16th day of July, 1965, the defendant was duly adjudged a brulkrupt, under the acts of Congress relating to Bankruptcy, by an Order made and entered in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Colorado, andl rthe defendant having complied
with all the requirements of the law in that respect, it was
thereafter ordeI\..od by said Court discharged from all debts
and claims prove·able by said Acts against his estate, and
which existed on the 16th day of July, 1965, on which day
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the petition for adjudication was filed by the defendant,
excepting such debts as are by law excepted from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy. Defendant claims that
none of the acts complained of are proved, in law sufficient
to except the debts sued on from discharge of bankruptcy.
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT
The matter was set for trial, and after hearing, the
Court, sitting without a jucy, found that on April 10, 1964,
the defendant was made aware of the precarious financial
situation of the business in which he was engaged and from
which he would have to look to repay any funds that he
might borrow; that he did not reveal to the plaintiffs any
of the circumstances that rendered his situation precarious,
but kept it concealed from them by active representation
ooncerning the prosperity and stability of the business and
his ability to pay any sums iby him; that all sums borrowed
from the plaintiffs borrowed after such date, totaling $23,400.00 were oibtained by fraud, and are excepted from discharge in bankruptcy; that the sum of $3,600.00 is awarded
as attorney fees in this matter, making a total judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant of $27,·
000.00.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered

substantially in conformance with the memorandwn decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment of the
Lower Court against Appellant, Robert H. Davis.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
That during all times material in tltls action, defendant
was the president of Mountain Motors, Inc., A Utah Corporation, also knorwn as, Provo Studebaker Company, and
was the manager and operator of the corporation's Studebaker automobile agency in Provo, Utah.
That plaintiffs loaned to defendalllt the following sums
of money on or about the dates indicated:
November 24, 1961. .......... .
July 15, 1962 ................. .
July 22, 1963 ................. .
February 22, 1964. . . . . . . . .... .
April 14, 1964 ................ .
May 20, 1964 ................. .
July 9, 1964 .................. .
August 11, 1964 .............. .

$ 5,000.00
$ 5,200.00
$ 5,000.00
$ 4,495.25
$ 5,000.00
$ 6,500.00
$ 6,900.00
$ 5,000.00

TOTAL . . . . . .

$43,096.25

That promissory notes were made, executed and delivered by defendant to the plaintiffs covering ea.ch of said
loons, and upon at least one occasion, to-wit, on or about

May 25, 1964, defendant consolidated and renewed the loans
which were then outstanding by the execution of a new
promissory note in the amount of $25,000.00, and at that
time the then outstanding nortes were destroyed.
11hat at the time of the consolidation in May of 1964,
whoo defendant was asked for security, defendant informed
plaintiffs that he had no security to give them but that he
would obtain a term insurance policy for their protection
in the event of his deaith. That all of the notes prior to
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May 20, 1964, given by Mr. Davis to the Gears, were intentionally returned to Mr. Davis and cancelled (R. 52).
That in addition to the foregoing, plaintiffs purchased
100 share3 orf capital stock of Mountain Motors, Inc., for
the sum of $12,500.00 from the defendant herein on or
about S2pitemb€'r 25, 1963, and pa.id for said stock the sum
of $7,450.00 by their check and $5,050.00 by cancellation
of defendant's promissocy norte payable to plaintiffs dated
July 22, 1963, in the amount of $5,000.00; that on or about
January 9, 1964, plainitiffs purchased from defendant an
additional 10 shares of capital stock of Mountain Mortors,
Inc., and paid therefor the sum of $1,250.00.
That Rdbert H. Davis ceased being the manager and
president orf Moun1::ain Motors, Inc., December 7, 1964, at a
time when the corporation had a net worth of $76,532 (R.
137). Shortly thereafter in January of 1965, plaintiff, E.
L. Gear, a Mr. Weight, a Mr. Ross Fazzio, a Mr. Austin
Ohiles, a Mr. Roxie Childs, and the Olivers commenced
running Mountain Motor3, Inc. (R. 166). Plaintiffs E. L.
Gear and Fe:m Bate Gear, husband and wife, continued to
loan money to the corporation "Mountain Motors" in 1965,
after defendant, Robert H. Davis, had left the corporation.
(R. 68).

That on or about July 16, 1965, defendant was adjudi·
cated a bankrupt on a petition filed by him in the District
Court of the United States for the District of Colorado,
Denver, Colorado; that the indebtedness of defendant to
plaintiffs referred to above was duly scheduled for discharge; that on or about February 24, 1966, the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado made
and entered an order discharging defendant from all prove-
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able claims and debts, except debts excepted by the Bankruptcy Aot from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy.
That in or about the month of Felbruary, 1964, partially beoause the Studebaker Company had moved its automobile manufacturing business to Canada, the sales of
automobiles by Mountain Motors, Inc., dropped from between 25 to 30 per month to ,about 2 per month; that repossessions of previously sold automobiles by Mountain
Motors during February and March, 1964, increased at an
unprecedented rate; that on or about April 10, 1964, de~
fendant was informed by his accountant and knew that the
business of Mountain Motors, Inc., had lost approximately
$22,000.00 in the previous six (6) months. That defendant did not inform plaintiffs of this fact.
That at no time did plaintiffs ever request a financial
statement from defendant, and none was given.
Plaintiffs testified and the court so found that on or
about April 14, 1964, defendant stated to plaintiffs that he
wanted to buy the stock of Mountain Motors, Inc., owned
by Chester and M01bel Oliver; that the business of Mountain Motors was very good, and that it was in sound .financial condition; that if he owned the stock which was then
owned by the Olivers he would be able to save Mountain
Motors, Inc., about $1,300.00 each month since he was
paying that much to them; that on or about May 20, 1964,
defendant, in substance and effect, repeated said statement,
and assured plaintiffs that there was no chance at all of
losing their money. That on or about July 9, 1964, dekndant stated to plaintiffs that he wanted to buy stock
owned by Ross F·azzio in Mountain Motors, Inc., because
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Ross Fazzio was demanding equality in the busines.s and
That on or about August 11, 1964, defendant stated to plaintiffs that he wan.
ted to borrow $5,000.00 in order to pay off the back part
of the property then being occupied by Mountain Motors,
Inc., and that he would then rent it back to the corporation
for the sum of $750.00 per month.
was interfering with its op2ration.

That although plaintiff, E. L. Gear. was a member of
the Board of Directors of Mountain Motors, Inc., he was
not notified of any directors meetings and did not attend
any of said meetings.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR TIIE
COURT TO HOLD THAT AS TO ALL SUMS BORROWED
BY THE DEFENDANT FROM PLAINTIFFS AFTER
APRIL 10, 1964, WERE EXCEPTED FROM DISCHlARGE
IN BANKRUPTCY.
Plaintiffs complained that on April 14, 1964, May 20,
1964, and July 9, 1964, defendant made misrepresentations
as to the financial condition of Mountain Motors, Inc.
(Amended Complaint paragraph 2 and 3).
Plaintiffs further complained that on August 11, 1964,
defendant misrepresented what he intended to do with the
money borrowed.
Two issues of law are presented as to the effect of the
misrepresentation as found by the Court: (1) Does Sec·
tion 17a(2) of the Bankrupty Act require that false or
fraudulent statements of financial condition be in writing
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before the plaintiff can assert this section of 1lhe Act; and
(2) d0€S a promise to use money in a particular manner
constitute fraud if the money is used otherwise?
(1) Prior to 1960, Section 17a(2) did not include the
statement conc-erning false financial statements, but Section 14c(3) did have this statement. S. Rep. No. 1688,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960) sets out the reasons for making the change. It appears that Congress was concerned
tha·t although the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to
protect debtors, finance companies were inducing people
to borrow and in doing so, were requiring tile borrowers
to fill out financial statements which were tricky and which
only the most observant could fill out correctly. Then, if
the debtor subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the creditor
could object in the bankruptcy court to discharge of this
obligation by asserting that credit was extended on the
basis of a false financial statement.
Therefore, in 1960, Congress changed Section 14c(3)
so that it applied only to businessmen; however, this opened
the field too wide, therefore they adopted exactly rthe same
language into Section 17a(2). This meant, that in fraud
cases, thee creditor would at least have the possibility of
bringing an action in the state court (however, the buTden
of proof \Vould now be shifted to the plaintiff) . This is
the way the Bankruptcy Act stands today.
Since 1960 there have been at least three cases deciding the exact issue of whether the statement of financial
condition had to be written to preclude the defendant from
asse11:ing discharge:
(a) Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sofio, 138 So. 2d 616 (3)
(La. Ct. App. 1963). In this case, the Court said:
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"The credit manager of plaintiff, testified that he
asked defendant if he owed any other debits and that
defendant answer12d that he did not. Defendant denies
positively that any such que.'::tion was asked of him
and says that he made no repre.;:·mtation on the subject. (He did owe other debts.) We are not required
to re.solve that dispute, for the reason that ·the language of the bankruptcy law is explicit in the requirement that to prevent the discharge of a debt, the false
statement by the debtor as to his financial condition
must be in writing."
(b) Dial Finance Co. v. Duthu, 188 So. 2d 151 (La.
Ct. App. 1966). In this case, the court said that even "an

intent to deceive without a written false [financial] statement will not except the debtor under rthis section of the
statute." (Id. at 156).
(c) Friendly Finance Discount Corp. v. Haydn, 171
So. 2d 717 (La. Ct. App. 1964). The court, in this case,
held that tllere was discharge under Section 17a(2) even
though tha-e was a financial statement which was written.
The reason stated by the court was that plaintiff did not
rely on the written statement, but rather, on other oral
statements made by the defendant concerning the defend·
ant's financial condition, and these statements were not
set down in writing as required by the statute.
Also, since 1960, there have been several cases stat·
ing that the representation of financial condition must be
in writing, but because there, in fact, were written financial
statements, the courts •have held that there should be no
discharge.

E.: g., Midland Discount Co. v. Robichaux, 184 So.2d
93 (La Ct. App. 1966), in which the court stated:
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"Before thor,,,e pertinent provisions of Section 71 can
prevent the bankrupt from being released by the discharge in bankruptcy, it is ·incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that: (1) plaintiff advanced the loan in
reliance upon a financial statement made by the defendant . . ." (Id. at 96).

(La.

Cash Finance Service, Inc. v. Raisch, 173 So.2d 851
C~. App. 1965), where the court said:

"Before the . . . provisions [11 U.S.C. Sec. 35a(2)
(1964)] can be applicable we deem it incumbent upon
the plaintiff to show: (1) that plaintiff granted the
extension or renewal in reliance upon a written financial statment made by the defendant . . ." (Id. at
853).
Household Finance Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St.2d
190 214 N.E.2d 667 (1966), in which the court said:
"A discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a defendant from liability on his promissory note, where the
debt for which the note was given was created in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing by
such defendant for the purpose of obtaining such credit from plaintiff."

'I\vo other cases saying generally the same thing are,
Household Finance Co. v. !De Shazo, 359 P.2d 1044, 1046
{Wash. 1961); and First Credit Corp. v. Wellnitz, 21 Wis.
2d 18, 123 N.W.2d 519 (1963).
Because the language in Section 17a(2) is adopted directly from Section 14c(3), the construction which has historically applkd to the latter section should now apply
to Sectioo 17. For an interpretation of the phrase "in
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writing" see the cases cited ill1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1387,
From these cases, it is obvious fuat
this section did not give a plaintiff grounds for objection

n.3 (14th ed. 1966).

to discharge on mere false oral statements of financial condition.

The statement had to be written.

A:s to the alleged false statements made by defendant

to induce the plaintiffs to act ill1 this case:
The statement made by Davis to Gears that he wanted
to buy the stock orf Mountain Motors, Inc., owned by Ches-

ter and Mabel Oliver-; that there was no chance at all of
losing their money; that he wanted to buy the stock owned
by Ross Fazzio in Mountain Motors, Inc., because Ross Fazzio was demanding equality in rtheir business and was inter·
fering with its operation; that he wanted to horrmv $5,·
000.00 in order to pay off the back part of the property
then being occupied by Mountain Motors, Inc., and that he
would then rent it back to the corporation for the sum of
$750.00 per month; are statements of futurity and prom·
ises.

The general rule, which is supported by numerous decisions in almost all American and British jurisdictions, is
that fraud must be related to the present or pre-existing
fact, and cannot ordinarily be predicated upon 'representa·
ti.on or statements which involve mere matters of futurity
or tlrings to be dcne or- performed in the future. See 23
Am Jur 35:794; 17 A.L.R.2d 1208 (37); 139 P. 986 (44);
Adamson, et ux. vs. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (49); Marlin
vs. Drury, 228 P.2d 803 (60); Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P.2d
273 (63).
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a
finding of fraud sufficient to except the debt from the discharge in bankruptcy under Section 17a of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. Any statement as to financial condition
must be in writing, and the statements of the defendant in
this case, other than as to his financial condition, are statemenrts of futurity and promises not sufficient to except the
debt from discharge in bankruptcy.
The judgment should be set aside and judgment entered for defendanrt.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY H. IVIE, Esq.
48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant

